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Non-technical Summary 
German electricity submarkets for residential customers have been liberalized by the end of the 
1990s. Since then a large number of new providers has entered former monopolistic markets, which 
are first and foremost retail markets. However, only a low share of households in Germany has 
switched to a competitive contract. Following the Monitoringbericht 2008 of the German energy 
regulator Bundesnetzagentur about 60 percent of households have not switched to an alternative 
contract, even ten years after the liberalization. These households are served with incumbents’ 
standard contracts, the so-called “Grundversorgungsverträge”. Usually, standard contracts are of-
fered at significantly higher prices than competitive contracts due to high customers’ switching 
costs. In this paper we follow the question how the standard contract price or the price-cost markup 
for this contract could be used to influence market structure. 
Following the Limit Pricing theory, we show that retail competition in terms of the number of com-
petitors depends on the standard contract price and that the provider of this contract type might use 
the price as an instrument to affect competition in its home market ceteris paribus. By reducing the 
standard contract price customers’ net benefits of switching to an alternative contract could be re-
duced. Thus, market entry might be not profitable for less efficient supplier. We would then expect 
a lower number of electricity suppliers in markets with lower standard contract prices. Whether the 
low-price strategy is profit-increasing for the incumbent depends on the behavior of the customers: 
With a lower standard contract price also the price-cost markup is lower. On the other hand, lower 
numbers of customers are willing to switch to competitive contracts.  
We analyze the limit pricing idea using a simultaneous equations approach and employ data for all 
geographically separated German retail electricity submarkets. We control for alternative regional 
impact characteristics such as customer concentration, purchasing power, grid characteristics as 
well as the distribution charge, which providers have to pay for electricity provision in a market. 
Our estimation results show a significant effect of the standard contract price (or price-cost markup)  
on the number of offered contracts and number of the competitors offering contracts to low con-
sumption customers (one-person households) in a distinct market. However, the number of the 
competitors offering contracts to households with higher consumption is not affected by the stand-
ard contract price but by the distribution charge, which is in line with the theoretical literature. Con-
tracts per provider instead show that providers in a market with a lower number of competitors offer 
more contracts given the price-cost markup. Thus, our results show that, besides the distribution 
charge, incumbents can also affect competition due to customers’ high relative switching costs. 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
Seit der Liberalisierung des deutschen Strommarktes Ende der neunziger Jahre sehen sich frühere 
regionale Monopolisten neu eingetretenen Konkurrenten gerade in Endverbrauchermärkten gegen-
über. Der Monitoringbericht 2008 der Bundesnetzagentur zeigt, dass viele Jahre nach der Liberali-
sierung etwa 60 Prozent der Haushalte noch keinen Vertragswechsel durchgeführt haben. Diese 
Haushalte werden durch sogenannte Grundversorgungsverträge des größten Anbieters im Markt 
versorgt. Grundversorgungsverträge werden wegen der geringen Wechselbereitschaft der Haus-
haltskunden meist zu signifikant höheren Preisen angeboten als wettbewerbliche Verträge. In die-
sem Papier untersuchen wir die Frage, ob daher Grundversorgungsvertragspreise genutzt werden, 
um den regionalen Wettbewerb um Haushaltskunden zu beeinflussen. 
Wir zeigen in einem einfachen theoretischen Modell, dass die Anzahl der Wettbewerb bzw. die Ent-
scheidung in einen Markt einzutreten durch die Höhe des Preises des Grundversorgungsvertrags 
beeinflusst werden kann. Mit einem niedrigeren Grundversorgungspreis kann einerseits der Nutzen 
für Nachfrager aus einem Wechsel zu einem alternativen Vertrag verringert werden. Daher könnte 
sich ceteris paribus der Markteintritt für weniger effiziente Wettbewerber nicht lohnen und man 
sollte eine geringere Anzahl von Wettbewerbern erwarten. Der Erfolg eines niedrigeren Preises ist 
allerdings vom Verhalten der Nachfrager abhängig: Ein niedrigerer Standardvertragspreis resultiert 
in einer geringeren Preis-Kosten-Marge, macht den Standardvertrag allerdings attraktiver für Nach-
frager.  
Im nächsten Schritt untersuchen wir empirisch, inwieweit eine solche Limit Pricing Strategie der 
Grundversorger existiert. Dazu verwenden wir Daten für alle deutschen Strommärkte für Haus-
haltskunden und kontrollieren für regionale Einflussfaktoren wie Nachfragerkonzentration, Kauf-
kraft, Netzcharakteristika und das regulierte Netznutzungsentgelt, die Durchleitungsgebühr für 
Strom. Unsere Schätzergebnisse zeigen einen hoch signifikanten Einfluss des Preises des Grundver-
sorgungsvertrags auf die Anzahl der angebotenen Verträge und die Anzahl der neuen Anbieter für 
Haushaltskunden mit geringem Verbrauch. Für das Kundensegment mit höherem Verbrauch sind 
keine Effekte zu beobachten. Unsere Ergebnisse stützen darüber hinaus die aus der theoretischen 
Literatur bekannte Hypothese, dass ein höheres (reguliertes) Netznutzungsentgelt einen negativen 
Einfluss auf die Anzahl der Wettbewerber im nachgelagerten Markt hat. Anbieter, die trotz eines 
höheren Netznutzungsentgeltes in den Markt eintreten, bieten ceteris paribus mehr Verträge an und 
schließen damit die Lücke aus einer niedrigeren Zahl an Wettbewerbern. Wir können daher zeigen, 
dass neben den Netznutzungsentgelten hohe relative Wechselkosten und das strategische Verhalten 
der ehemaligen Monopolisten die Markteintritte beeinflussen können.  
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In German electricity submarkets for residential customers standard contracts offered by former 
monopolists are the more costly option for customers who have not switched to an alternative con-
tract yet. As most German households are served with this contract type we follow the Limit Pricing 
theory and show that standard contract price could be used as an instrument to affect competition, in 
terms of market entries, in the related market. We theoretically derive the optimal price-setting be-
havior of a price-discriminating incumbent provider and show that under particular circumstances 
reducing the standard contract price could increases the incumbent’s profit. We then analyze our 
theoretical findings employing data for German retail electricity submarkets using simultaneous 
equation approach and can find support for our hypothesis. In particular for customers with low 
consumption and high relative switching costs the results show that the standard contract price can 
affect market entry whereas for high consumption level customers we have to reject our hypothesis. 
 
L11, L13, L43, L94 – barrier to entry, first-mover advantage, price discrimination
                                                          
1
 ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, L7,1, D-68161 Mannheim, Tel.: +49-621-1235 386,  
nikogosian@zew.de 
2
 WHU- Otto Beisheim School of Management, Burgplatz 2, D-56179 Vallendar 
3
 ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, L7,1, D-68161 Mannheim, Tel.: +49-621-1235 296, veith@zew.de 
1 
 
1 Introduction 
Electricity markets in Europe were liberalized during the 1990s. Since then new entrants are al-
lowed to enter the market and offer energy contracts to customers of former national or regional 
monopolists. However, particularly in Germany only a very low number of residential customers 
have switched to an alternative provider. Following the “Monitoringbericht 2008”, an annual survey 
by the German regulator Bundesnetzagentur, only 6.4 percent of all German households switched to 
an alternative provider, 34 percent switched to an alternative incumbent contract and about 60 per-
cent stayed with incumbents’ standard contracts. 
The largest retail provider - that is the former monopolist in each local submarket, is obliged to of-
fer a particular contract type, namely the standard contract, due to universal service obligations 
(USOs). As the retail markets are not regulated each incumbent can individually determine its 
standard contract price. The prices for standard contracts are higher than for alternative contracts 
offered in the markets. Additionally, incumbents offer alternative contracts to customers who are 
more willing to switch. Thus, they charge higher prices from customers with high switching costs 
while they offer low-price contracts to those customers who are willing to switch their contract or 
supplier. This behavior is a form of third degree price discrimination (see e.g. Schmalensee (1981)). 
As customers in the standard contract seem to be highly price-insensitive we analyze the hypothesis 
that standard contract price adjustments could be used as a strategic instrument to affect competition 
in terms of number of competitors or contracts in retail markets. 
We adopt the idea of limit pricing models as introduced in Bain (1949) and extended in Dixit 
(1979) and rearrange it to the framework observed in German retail energy markets for household 
customers. In a simple theoretical model of market deterrence we first show that the level of the 
standard contract price might have an impact on the number of contracts in the market. However, 
this is possible only if the incumbent, as a first mover, can commit itself to a price strategy. Thus, if 
the strategy of the price leader is binding, market deterrence might occur.  
Using data for numerous German geographically separated electricity submarkets we test the theo-
retical outcome.  We determine the impact factors of distribution charges and standard contract 
prices separately and analyze how the difference in standard contract prices and distribution charge, 
known as the price-cost markup influences the number of competitors, the number of contracts with 
prices below the standard contract price and the number of contracts per provider in about 850 local 
markets. We conduct this analysis for three alternative user groups (demanding 1500, 2800 and 
4000 kWh per year) as proposed in Salies and Waddams Price (2004) or Salies (2008). Note that 
the distribution charges are cost-based regulated, thus, the only strategic instrument is the incum-
bent’s retail price.  
We find that the number of contracts in a local market is on average positively affected by the 
price-cost markup of the standard contract. However, we do not observe a clear evidence for market 
deterrence, as the number of entrants is negatively affected by the price-cost markup only for high 
consumption level (4000 kWh). Thus, our empirical results provide evidence for the standard con-
tract price being an additional strategic instrument to affect the number of contracts, and thus, the 
extent of price discrimination, but not for market entry.  
The paper is organized as follows: We first give an overview of the existing literature. Next we pre-
sent our theoretical model based on the situation observed for Germany followed by the discussion 
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on the outcomes of the model. In section 4 we describe the data and derive the estimation model. 
Section 5 provides the estimation results and their discussion. The last section concludes the paper. 
2 Related Literature 
Electricity markets are in the focus of multiple strands of literature. While there is a non-exhaustive 
range of literature on wholesale competition, production and the challenges of transmission, we 
mainly concentrate on the description of retail competition and entry barriers.  
Only a few empirical studies consider the effects of market liberalization on incumbents’ market 
power. For example, Salies and Waddams Price (2004) analyze how competition in UK retail ener-
gy markets is affected by the market power of single providers. They find that prices are determined 
not only by customer characteristics and cost factors but particularly also by incumbency.  
Salies (2008) takes up these results and analyzes which factors affect competition and thus contracts 
offered to private customers. He finds that providers first differentiate between rural and urban cus-
tomers as prices are significantly lower in more densely populated areas. Concerning grid character-
istics he identifies underground cables to be a “price-reducer” since underground cables are less 
affected by climate impact factors. Moreover, Salies shows that transmission charges on both higher 
voltage and distributional level also positively affect retail prices. Finally, he identifies significantly 
higher prices for incumbents.
4
 
The theoretical literature distinguishes between vertical and horizontal market entry deterrence. A 
vertically integrated provider controls an essential input (distribution network) for downstream 
competitors and is also involved in downstream competition. Because of this exceptional position it 
is able to influence downstream prices or quality aspects of goods by altering characteristics of the 
essential input. The issue of vertical foreclosure is extensively discussed in Rey and Tirole (2003). 
As providers have to pay a network access charge it could be used to foreclose downstream compet-
itors as is shown in Stiglitz (1979). To prevent such an abuse network (distribution) charges are 
regulated and have to be paid by all downstream supplying firms regardless of their vertical rela-
tions with distribution network operators.  
In contrast to vertical foreclosure horizontal foreclosure means a firm’s strategic pricing that can 
force competitors out of a market or used to deter entry. One particular theory in this context is the 
limit-pricing theory which focuses on a monopolist who chooses a lower price under the threat of 
entry than in a closed-market situation. Bain (1949) argues that a price chosen sufficiently low pre-
vents new providers from market entry. Despite the criticism as it could not really be proven in real-
ity (since the prices adjust after the market entry and a monopolist’s price choice is flexible in it-
self), further theoretical studies provide alternative ideas how price reduction could be used as an 
instrument to deter market entry (Dixit, 1979, 1980, Spence, 1977 and Milgrom and Roberts, 
1982b). Pricing strategies to foreclose competitors in a market are examined mainly under the um-
brella of predatory pricing (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1982a). In this context the predator re-
duces its price to drive competitors out of the market. In the short run prices could be chosen even 
                                                          
4
 A further central aspect of this paper is the analysis of the correlation of vertical integration and incumbent prices. The 
author finds vertical integration aspects to be of less importance than regional aspects. We want to address this research 
question in a subsequent paper for German electricity markets where we use data for the incumbent operators and com-
pare price differences of standard contracts with regard to vertical integration with grid owners, the four high-voltage 
companies and municipal firm alliances. 
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below marginal costs, thus inducing losses that could be recouped after competitors have left the 
market. However, predation falls under the treatment of national and EU antitrust law.  
Klemperer (1987) shows that in markets with high switching costs the incumbent can lower the 
output and deter market. He too suggests that the larger the consumer base in the pre-entry period 
the less likely is an aggressive behavior of the incumbent to attract new customers and compete 
with the entrant when price discrimination between new and old costumers is not possible. To deter 
market entry the incumbent could “limit over-price” in the pre-entry period and then compete with 
the entrant in the second period. This behavior might weaken market entry incentives. 
Our theoretical model refers to the idea of limit pricing in retail markets, where the price is not reg-
ulated, the former monopolists are the current incumbents in their local markets, and distribution 
charges for the electricity grid are the same for all firms as they are regulated. The assumption in 
our model is that the incumbent move first by setting a binding price for its standard contract. The 
potential entrants observe the prices and decide whether to enter or not. In contrast to Klemperer 
(1987) we assume that the incumbent is able to discriminate between customers with low and high 
switching costs but we do not model the switching costs explicitly. Furthermore, the assumption of 
price competition might be appropriate as the total market demand is assumed to be (at least in the 
short run) inelastic in the electricity markets for household customers and new customers do not 
enter the market (market expansion does not occur due to market entry). We want to show that lim-
it-pricing can be rational for former monopolists in the electricity markets and test this hypothesis 
using cross-sectional data for household customers in Germany. As suggested in the literature on 
market entry, for example in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), we too assume that a market can accom-
modate a certain number of newcomers that enter as long as the expected profits are non-negative.   
3 Competition in the Retail Market 
3.1 Description of the German Electricity Market 
The German electricity market is much more geographically decentralized than other European 
electricity markets. In the production and high voltage transmission system four transmission sys-
tem operators (TSOs) exist which are active in their regionally separated high voltage areas. At the 
low voltage level, there are about 850 regionally separated markets for household electricity provi-
sion.
5
 These are delineated by the geographical area supplied by only one distribution operator. In 
each market only one distribution operator and one downstream incumbent is active. The definition 
of the relevant market for household customers is applied by the German Competition Authority in 
cases of market power abuse. We follow another market definition for our empirical analysis, which 
is described in the Data section. Figures 1 and 2 provide an overview of regional separation:
6
 Figure 
1 displays the four highest voltage areas of E.On
7
, EnBW, RWE and Vattenfall Europe.
8
 The E.On 
area is the largest, the EnBW the smallest of the four regions. The TSOs keep about 85 percent of 
the electricity production capacities in Germany (in 2008).  Moreover, long-run supply-agreements 
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 See the Monitoringbericht 2008. 
6
 Data for the graphs are provided by E’net. 
7
 Recently E.on sold its transmission grid to TenneT (in 2010). As we employ Data from 2008 we consider E.on as the 
owner of the Grid. 
8
 Note that there are also transmission regions close to the German border which are operated either by foreign trans-
mission grid providers or by smaller providers. 
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and over the counter trade with regional energy providers exist and, thus, only about one fifth of 
electricity trade takes place at the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig.  
On the distribution level local grid operators were mainly integrated with retail energy providers but 
were forced to disentangle production, distribution and retail into legally separated companies by 
the introduction of legal unbundling in 2007 to prevent discrimination against the entrants.
9
  
All in all, former monopolistic energy providers still keep the absolute majority of customers in 
their home markets mainly in standard contracts but also in newly installed, more competitive con-
tracts. On average more than 40 additional providers are active in each electricity market with a 
market share of less than 10 percent of all retail customers.
10
 Switching away from incumbent to a 
competitor is still very rare. Figure 2 displays the 850 separated distribution areas. Two equally 
large regions exist, one in North-Eastern Germany and one in Bavaria. The first mainly covers the 
less densely populated area in Germany. In contrast, the most-densely populated area, the Rhine-
Ruhr area in Western Germany, is separated into a multitude of very small distribution areas. For 
the access to one of these local markets electricity providers have to pay a cost-based regulated dis-
tribution charge.
11
 This distribution charge is a two-part tariff composed of two fixed-part elements 
which are a fixed annual charge and a metering charge. The variable charge depends on the amount 
of consumed energy.
12
 Distribution charges are market specific and the same for all suppliers. 
Competitors that entered the market are mostly newcomers that were not active in electricity mar-
kets before the liberalization. Beside the newcomers, a few former monopolists decided to expand 
in new geographically separated markets and also low-cost suppliers that have been set up mostly 
by the four major electricity producing companies, entered particular markets. Electricity contracts 
for household customers are mostly equipped with specific characteristics. For example, customers 
can choose contracts with different shares of renewable energy or contract duration. Additionally, 
there are contracts with particular bonus schemes or price reductions. Product differentiation is one 
of the crucial factors to relax intense price competition. However, all of these contract characteris-
tics only slightly affect provision costs.
13
 In contrast to these recent types of differentiation, the 
standard  
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 The obligation to separate the grid from other activities, such as retail or production, applies only for firms with more 
than 100.000 customers. Firms which do not reach this threshold are allowed to remain within the same company.  
10
 Note that these alternative providers are much more successful with regard to industrial customers. 
11
 Regulation changed in 2009 from cost-based regulation to revenue-cap regulation. 
12
 Since 2009 the distribution charges are incentive based regulated (revenue cap). In our empirical analysis, however, 
we employ cost-based regulated distribution charges from 2008.  
13
 We do not have any production cost information for our analysis below. Therefore, we have introduced contract 
dummies and, alternatively, company dummies to cover (among others) production or procurement costs. These dum-
mies were of no significance for prices offered to customers. Also with other estimation model specifications we find 
only a low number of dummies being significant which, in our opinion, is a sign for strong similarities among providers 
taking into account the range of other variables used in our study. 
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Figure 1: Regional separation of the German Electricity Transmission Market
14
 
 
Figure 2: Regional separation of the German Electricity Distribution Market  
 
 have significantly less (or no) “add-on” characteristics but are offered at a higher price. By law 
these have to be offered by the energy provider which serves the majority of household customers 
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 All maps in this paper are generated using GfK GeoMarketing information. 
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in a region. It could be interpreted as a “fall-back” option for customers who have switched to an 
alternative contract. They automatically return to the standard contract either if their new provider 
leaves the market or if their contract is deleted and customers in this contract have not decided 
where to switch (§§ 36 – 38, Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (EnWG)). However, as already mentioned 
above, the Monitoringbericht of the German regulator Bundesnetzagentur reports that about 60 per-
cent of all German households have not switched yet (c.f. Monitoringbericht 2008). Note that in all 
German retail markets former monopolists are still the providers of standard contracts. Neverthe-
less, they are also allowed to offer alternative contracts. These contracts are much more similar to 
those of new competitors but they are also a successful instrument for binding potential “switchers” 
as most switching households stay with their incumbent providers (34 percent).  
3.2. Theoretical model 
In the following, we consider sequential price competition with differentiated products and the 
threat of potential market entry in a three stage game. Differentiated contracts for electricity supply 
are offered by the dominant provider and one alternative competitor. We assume that the dominant 
provider offers two types of contracts, a standard contract at price stp  and a competitive contract at 
price 1p  for customers with low switching costs that are willing to switch.
15
 The competitor offers 
one contract at price 2p . We assume that one further (potential) competitor will enter the market 
with only one contract at a price 3p  if its expected profits are larger than zero. The timing of the 
game is as follows: first, the incumbent determines the price for the standard contract. Then the 
competitor and the potential entrant observe this price and the potential competitor decides to enter 
the market or not. Finally, all providers choose their competitive contract prices simultaneously. 
With these assumptions, we follow the Limit Pricing theory with fully informed firms maximizing 
their profits given that the strategy of the price leader (incumbent) is binding. Thus, the incumbent 
can commit itself to a price for its standard contract and the competitors consider this price strategy 
as credible. If for example the price leader decreases its price for the standard contract (in contracts 
to alternative contracts) then an immediate increase is not profitable since a number of customers 
could prompt switching to another contract or other electricity supplier.16 
 
Customers are of mass 1 and individually ask for an identical quantity of electricity.
 17
 All custom-
ers who have not yet switched are in the standard contract st. For reasons of simplicity we assume 
that customers switch to an alternative contract if the net utility increase of switching is sufficiently 
large. The demand for contract  1,2,3,i st is then defined as function of contract prices in the 
market. We keep the usual price-demand assumptions:  
                                                          
15
 Note that we do not model the switching costs explicitly. The heterogeneity in the switching costs is implicitly cap-
tured in the demand and price functions of the offered contracts. 
16
 Since the standard contract can be switched monthly, incumbents seldom adjust prices because in that case customers 
have to be informed about the price change. Thus, compared with other contracts with longer contract duration, we 
observe rare price adjustments for the standard contract. Usually, the majority of the incumbents announce their price 
adjustments simultaneously. This could mitigate switching effects because of the announcements in the popular press 
and customers perception that prices are affected in the whole industry and therefore  switching to another supplier is 
not  beneficial. 
17
 We assume total market demand to be price inelastic in the short run. 
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We first analyse the situation without strategic intervention of the incumbent and then show that 
under particular conditions it could be profitable for an incumbent to offer a standard contract at a 
lower price to keep a competitor out of the market.  
3.2.1 Optimal pricing with market entry 
We solve the game by backward induction and start where the potential competitor decides to enter 
the market. The profit functions are then: 
1
2 2
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1 1 1 1 1
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 (1) 
with 1 2 3N NN N   . Thus, N  is defined as the total number of customers who have “switched” 
from the standard contract to competitive contracts. All providers bear marginal costs ic , fixed 
costs iF , 1,2,3i  , and an identical, regulated per-unit distribution charge dc . We further assume 
that 2 3F F  to ensure that the potential entrant is the one targeted by the standard contract, as the 
entry condition must hold. The rational for this assumption is that first the higher-cost competitors 
are affected by incumbent’s pricing behaviour 
Beginning with the last stage, the optimal prices are determined by the FOC of the profit functions 
with respect to competitive prices. Thus, we obtain the implicit price reaction functions for the 
competitive contracts 
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2,3i  .  
Thus, we get the best response functions for the competitors’ contracts and for the incumbent’s 
competitive contract as 
1( , , , , ),  , 2,3,  
R R
i i st i ip p p p p c dc i i i i      and 1 1 2 3 1( , , , , )
R R
stp p p p p c dc .  
In the second stage the potential competitor observes the standard contract price *stp . It only enters 
the market if the zero condition holds: 
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Finally, given the implicit price reaction functions of the last stage and the entry decision of the 
potential customer we implicitly derive the optimal standard contract price:  
1
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 (3) 
The incumbent takes into account the (direct) price effect, the first two terms, and, additionally, an 
(indirect) price effect on its competitive contract price, the last term. Note that the incumbent uses 
its competitive contract to prevent customers from switching to an alternative provider. The higher 
the standard contract price the more customers choose an alternative contract. A higher demand for 
alternative contracts raises the prices for these contracts. The magnitude of this price effects de-
pends on 1
R
st
p
p


. If, for example, customers with standard contracts have high switching costs then 
the incumbent can raise the standard contract price without having a high impact on its competitive 
price. Thus, the higher the difference between the switching costs the bigger the gap between prices 
paid by different customer groups with different switching costs.
18
 When choosing its standard con-
tract price the incumbent has to deal with this trade-off between the standard contract price effect 
and the indirect effect on its own competitive contract. From (3) one can derive the equilibrium 
standard contract price as * *
1 2 3( , , , )st st dc c cp cp  which only depends on the (exogenously given) 
distribution charge and the variable costs of electricity provision. 
 
3.2.2 Optimal pricing with entry deterrence 
As mentioned above, we assume that competitors consider the standard contract price set by the 
incumbent in the first stage as binding. Depending on the price elasticity the loss caused by a stand-
ard contract price reduction is lower than the loss of a lower demand if a new competitor enters the 
market. In this scenario, the alternative standard contract price Astp  ( )stp
  has to satisfy the follow-
ing foreclosure condition: 3 1 2 3( , , , ) 0
A A A A
stp p p p  . A indicates the case of market deterrence. 
If provider 3 stays out of the market the remaining profit functions are as follows: 
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 22 2 2
( )(1 ) ( )
( )
A A A A A
st
A A A
p dc c N p dc c N F
p dc c N F
       
   


 (4) 
with 1 2
A A ANN N  , *Ast stp p .  
Thus, the new price reaction functions for the competitive contracts are 1 1 2 1( , , , )
AR AR A A
stp p p p c dc  
for the competitive incumbent contract and 2 2 1 2( , , , )
AR AR A A
stp p p p c dc  for the competitor’s con-
tract. In case of only two competitive contracts in the market and low standard contract price the 
demand for each contract is higher: , 1,2,A Ai iN NN N i   .  
Provider 3 would enter the market if its resulting profit just equals the profit from its outside option:  
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 This result reflects the theoretical findings of Varian (1980) in a sale model. 
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3 3 3 33 ( ) 0
A AA p dc c N F      (5) 
By assuming continuous price reaction functions we calculate the threshold standard contract price 
as the standard contract price with entry minus the standard contract price change due to the price 
reaction of potential competitor’s contract: 
3 3
3
( )AA
st st R
st
p p
p p
p p

  
 
 (6) 
Rearranging the threshold condition in (5) and replacing it into (6) yields: 
3 3 3 3
3 3 3
( )
( )
A
A
st st R R A
st st
p dc c N F
p p
p p p p N

      
    
 (7) 
The gap between the optimal standard contract price with three providers and the optimal standard 
contract price for entry deterrence depends mainly on two factors: first, the competitor’s price reac-
tion function and, second, the competitor’s marginal and fixed costs. The higher the cross-price 
effect and the higher the marginal costs, the lower the relevant effort for the incumbent. Obviously, 
the price-cost margin is lower with market deterrence than with market entry: 
1 1
A
st st
A
st st
p dc c p dc c
p p


   
 . 
From the incumbent’s perspective a price deviation is only profitable if *1 1 0
A A    , i.e. if the 
foreclosure profit exceeds the equilibrium profit with two competitors. Subtracting the profit in the 
static equilibrium situation from the one in the foreclosure situation and rearranging terms yields: 
 
* *
1 1 1
1 1
*
1 1
1 )
( ) ( ) ( )
        ( ) ( ( )
A
st st
A A A A A
st st
A A
p N p N p N p N p p
dc c N N N N
     
    

 (8) 
The sign of the first term is undetermined due to the price effect. As prices are strategic comple-
ments the competitive contract price increases with increasing standard contract price. On the other 
hand, with one contract less, the demand for each of the other contracts is higher. Therefore, except 
for the standard contract, the competitive contract price could be set higher than in case of market 
entry. As without further specification it is unclear which of the two effects outweighs the other no 
clear-cut answer concerning the sign of the first term could be deduced. The second and the third 
term represent the revenue effect, the last term is the increase in costs due to the demand effect, 
which are all positive. Thus, if the demand-driven revenue effect is sufficiently high, the incumbent 
could be better off choosing a lower standard contract price. This can be one equilibrium solution in 
which the standard contract price is low enough to deter further market entry. Note that we do not 
model the market demand explicitly by introducing the elasticities and switching costs. Thus, fur-
ther equilibrium solutions are possible. 
In a nutshell, we have shown, first, that market entry could be affected by the price or the price-cost 
margin of the incumbent and, second, that it might be even profitable for the incumbent to use its 
standard contract strategically.  
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Hypothesis: The price-cost margin or the price for the standard contract could affect the 
number of competitors in the market. Thus, the lower the price-cost margin the fewer com-
petitors are in the market.
19
  
4 Empirical Analysis 
In our econometric model we control for alternative impact factors on the standard contract price 
and also on the distribution charges. We have kept the theoretical model as simple as possible and 
assumed that each competitor offers only one contract. We relax this assumption in the empirical 
part of the paper and estimate along with the number of entrants, the number of competitive con-
tracts. Exogenous variables are the absolute price-cost margin (or the markup),
20
 stp dc , of the 
standard contract as well as additional instruments and control variables. According to our model 
the markup would determine the number of contracts or competitors. Due to lack of variables, such 
as firms’ demand or costs we are not able to identify how an incumbent uses its standard contract 
price to influence competition by using a structural form derived by our theoretical model.
21
 There-
fore, we apply a reduced form model to analyze whether the price markup affects the number of 
contracts and competitors or does not. If we find an effect statistically different from zero it means 
that incumbent providers are in a position where they can affect competition in terms of the number 
of competitors (or contracts) in the market.  
As it has been frequently shown in the literature on entry barriers to an essential facility that the 
distribution charges might act as a foreclosure instrument, therefore we did not focus on distribution 
charge regulation in our theoretical model. Nevertheless, we take distribution charges into account 
in the econometric analysis since these are regulated on a cost basis that in turn might be influenced 
by grid owners. As we observe huge variations between distribution charges among the market are-
as, we are in particular interested in network and market characteristics which influence operators’ 
costs and, thus, determine the distribution charges.  
4.1 Econometric Model 
Distribution charges are two-part tariffs which consist of a fixed fee for serving a particular custom-
er and a variable fee for the quantity of electricity transmitted to a household. For firms that offer 
differentiated contracts the marginal costs remain nearly the same as long as the wholesale electrici-
ty price is unaffected by the downstream contracts.  If that is not necessarily the case, suppliers can 
hedge their risks by trading future contracts. Thus, purchasing costs for electricity should not be 
affected by the contract terms. If our assumptions are applicable, we should observe a higher num-
ber of contracts (per firm) in markets with a higher standard contract price-distribution charge mar-
gin since differentiation allows for increasing profits due to heterogeneous customer characteristics 
and relaxed price competition. The higher the markup the more contracts can be offered. In contrast, 
a low markup cannot accommodate more variation in contracts and prices as the standard contract 
price is considered to be the highest in the market. We analyze both the impact of the incumbents’ 
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 We analyse also the impact of the price-cost margin on the number of contracts offered in the market and the aver-
age number of contracts per provider as an indicator for product differentiation.  
20
 We observe the distribution charges, which varies across the distinct markets. However, we have no data on mar-
ginal costs for electricity.  
21
 To account for firm heterogeneity, for example in costs, we introduced firm dummies.  The results of the estimation, 
however, remained unaffected (see also footnote 14). 
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behavior on the number of providers and on the number of offered contracts with prices below the 
standard contract price to see whether additional idiosyncratic elements in the decision to enter a 
market and to offer an additional contract exist.  
A competitors’ decision to enter a particular (sub) market is not only driven by the strategic behav-
ior of the incumbent but should also be affected by cost-related aspects (with regard to both prices 
and distribution charges) and customer characteristics (with regard to prices). As with most of em-
pirical literature on market entry that use cross-section data, we assume that a market can accom-
modate a certain number of entrants.
22
 This is the equilibrium number of competitors that given the 
equilibrium price and demand can enter without incur any losses. As discussed in detail in section 3 
the suppliers’ behavior might be driven by the customers’ price-sensitivity, procurement and pro-
duction costs and by the strategic interaction of competitors. Thus, we formulate the market supply 
equation as follows: 
 ( , , )i i i iy f markup dc customers  (9) 
where iy  stands for a) the number of providers, b) the number of contracts with prices below 
the standard contract price for each region and c) the number of contracts per provider with pric-
es below the standard contract price. imarkup  is the difference between the standard contract price 
charged by the incumbent in market i and the distribution charge in this market: 
 sti i imarkup p dc   (10) 
icustomers is a vector of customer characteristics. These customer characteristics are control varia-
bles which are dedicated to regional aspects like the number of multi-apartment houses or average 
household size. All variables are based on the zip-code area i  as price information is available on 
this aggregation level. 
We break down the markup into two explanatory equations:: 
 ( , )sti i ip g customers dc  (11) 
 ( )i idc h grid  (12) 
The price of the standard contract is explained by customer characteristics and market characteris-
tics, for example market density, and market specific distribution charges. As distribution charges 
are cot-based regulated, grid characteristics, igrid , such as grid length, meter points or grid losses, 
are employed meter points to proxy the grid costs gridc . For the empirical implementation of the 
equation system 9 to 12 we assume the following log-log structure: 
1 1
2 2
2 2
3 3
1 1 1
3
log( ) log( ) log( ) '
log( ) ' '
log( ) '
i markup i dc i i cust
st
i i cust i grid
i g idi r
y markup dc customers
p
dc
customers grid
grid
    
   
  
    
   
  
 (13) 
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 For example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), Berry and Valdfogel (1999), Abraham et al. (2007), and Ferrari and Ver-
boven (2010). 
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 ’s represent fixed effects while  ’s are coefficient vectors of the variables in the equations. 
)log( imarkup  and log( )idc in the first equation are constructed using the procedure proposed in 
Zellner and Theil (1962) where )log( imarkup is the difference of the standard contract price equa-
tion and the distribution charge equation. log( )idc  is instrumented using the distribution charge 
equation only.  
Distribution charges and, expectedly, standard contract prices are cost-oriented and thus differ 
among local markets. It is thus inevitable to use a measure which is comparable across multiple 
regions. The log-log specification excludes level effects which might stem from other regional in-
fluences not covered by other control variables. 
markup  and dc  represent the influence of strategic variables. If we find markup  being significantly 
positive we know that the markup of the standard contract positively affects the number of entrants 
and contracts (which corresponds to the hypothesis), i.e. the higher the standard contract price over 
the distribution charge the more contracts or providers are active in a market. If we additionally 
find dc  being significantly negative, distribution charges could also be used as an instrument for 
blocking entry as commonly mentioned in the literature (see e.g. Laffont and Tirole (2000)). Note 
that distribution charges are cost-based regulated. Price sensitivity could only be proxied through 
the coefficients of the customer characteristics. For our analysis we have employed alternative vari-
ables like purchasing power, share of multi-apartment houses and the fluctuation rate as the sum of 
households moving to and from a region. Price-sensitivity is expected to be higher when purchasing 
power is lower, and the higher the share of multi-apartment houses the higher the fluctuation rate. 
As we assume the competition equation depending on the other two equations, we estimate the 
equations simultaneously  employing 3SLS approach, where we constrain the price difference in the 
competition equations as described above. Using this estimation method we allow for correlation 
between the error terms among the equations as we assume that there exist certain market character-
istics or shocks which affect all endogenous variables in the equations system. 
4.2 Data Selection 
We employ data from multiple sources which provide information on offered contracts, grid charac-
teristics and customer characteristics at the zip code level and which represents a cross-sectional 
dataset as of September 2008. Data on household contracts were obtained from the online price 
comparison platform Verivox, where customers who are willing to switch their supplier can com-
pare the contracts offered by competitors.23 Our cross-sectional data include all contracts offered by 
a particular provider with all contract conditions, for example tariffs (mainly two-part tariffs) and 
bonuses provided via the Verivox platform. Data on distribution network characteristics, for exam-
ple, distribution areas, meter points and distribution charges are obtained from E’net, an infor-
mation service provider specialized in energy markets. As we have no contract-specific demand 
data, we use information on customer characteristics on a regional level provided by Acxiom. The 
comprehensive dataset includes household size and status information, area and building character-
istics and other socio-regional information which is calculated on a zip code level based on publicly 
available and private statistics.  
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 www.verivox.de, Verivox is the most established electricity comparison platform for all zip code regions in Germa-
ny. 
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In our study, the relevant geographic market equals the zip code area since entrants choose specific 
zip-code areas where they place their offer. In contrast, in case of market investigations according 
to German Competition Authority the geographical delineation equals the area supplied by one dis-
tribution network operator. As the zip code area does not necessarily equal the distribution area of 
one operator, we deviate from this market definition for empirical purposes because we observe 
market entries only in particular zip codes. Suppose that a network operator distributes the electrici-
ty in two zip codes 1 and 2. These zip codes are totally different in their market characteristics so 
that due to expected profits a firm decides to enter only in one zip code 1 but not in zip code 2. A 
problem occurs in cases where we observe two network operators in only one zip code. We omitted 
these zip codes in our empirical analyses to avoid assumptions on market characteristics at lower 
level than zip-codes.
24
 Note that we are not interested on firms’ individual pattern of entry but on 
the number of the entrants in a certain zip-code area. 
4.3 Data Description 
Table 1 provides an overview of the variables used in the econometric model. The last three col-
umns indicate which equations the variables enter and which effect is expected either from empiri-
cal findings in the literature or from a theoretical point of view and from the findings of our model 
presented above. The dependent variable in the supply equation is the number of providers, the 
number of contracts offered at a price below the standard contract price or the number of contracts 
per provider offered at a price below the standard contract price. The standard contract price is the 
total per year price which has to be paid by a representative one-, two- or three-and-more-person 
household in this type of incumbent contract. To construct the distribution charge variable we sum 
up the fixed elements (monthly fixed fee, metering fee) and add the quantity dependent element 
times the average consumption level (1500 kWh for one-person households, 2800 kWh for two-
person households and 4000 kWh for more-than-two-person households). 
We expect a negative effect of the distribution charges on the number of competitors and a positive 
effect on standard contract price. Additionally, we expect a positive effect of the markup on the 
dependent variables in the supply equations as explained by the theoretical model. While we did not 
differentiate providers from contracts in the theoretical part, we expect the markup effect on provid-
ers to be lower as the decision to enter a market is driven by more extensive start-up expenditures 
and, thus, by fewer impacts of short-run related aspects than the decision to offer an additional con-
tract. 
We expect a positive impact of purchasing power on both the supply and the standard contract price 
equations because a higher purchasing power allows for higher prices and more product differentia-
tion and consequently makes a region more attractive for competitors.  
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 Although demand characteristics are entirely independent among zip-code areas, there might be factors that are 
correlated between zip-code areas that are located within a relevant market supplied by one incumbent (distribution 
network operator). For example, the distribution charges are the same for all entrants independent in which zip-code 
area they entered as long as the zip-code areas are located within the relevant market. Factors that we do not observe 
are captured in the error terms of our equations. However, the error terms are assumed to be i.i.d..  As a relevant 
market is served by only one incumbent, introducing incumbent dummies to capture firm heterogeneity (as stated in 
footnote 14) we also capture the factors that are common for all zip-code area within the relevant market. 
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In contrast, our expectations concerning the share of houses with more than one apartment are am-
biguous: We expect a negative impact on distribution costs since in areas with high density less 
access lines have to be installed. The fluctuation rate is the share of households per total households 
which have moved into the zip code area or left it during the last year. We use this measure as a 
proxy for movements across the borders of the distribution area as we do not have information on 
this aggregation level. Since customers who want to be served by a contract other than the standard 
contract have to announce their choice about six to eight weeks before they move, we expect many 
households with switching intentions to switch after they have moved. Consequently, with a high 
fluctuation rate the (short-run) demand for a standard contract could be higher. Moreover, in regions 
with a higher fluctuation rate (e.g. around universities) we expect customers to be more flexible 
which might also affect their intention to switch to alternative contracts making these regions more 
attractive for competitors. 
15 
 
Table 1: Variables of the empirical model 
Dependent Variables     
# providers Number of providers 
Supply Function 
Equations 
# contracts below stand-
ard contracts 
Number of contracts with prices below the standard 
contract price 
# contracts/provider Number of contracts per provider 
standard contract price Standard contract price 
Standard contract 
price equation 
distribution charge 
Distribution charge to pay for supplying household 
consumers 
Distribution charge 
equation 
 
Independent Variables  
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Markup 
Markup of standard contract price over distribution 
charge 
+   
Customer Characteristics  
   
purchasing power/ 
household 
Purchasing power of households (single, double, fami-
ly) 
+ +  
share apartment build-
ings 
Share of houses with more than 1 apartment in a 
region 
- - - 
fluctuation rate 
Fluctuation rate (share of households moving to a 
region and leaving a region per total households) 
households) 
+/- +  
Grid Characteristics  
   
distribution area (lv) Distribution area of low voltage grid (sq. km) 
+ + + 
distribution area 
(lv)/area 
Share distribution area of low voltage grid 
+ +/- - 
share cable 
Share of low voltage cable grid length per total low 
voltage distribution grid length (also including over-
head lines) 
 - - 
# meter points lv Number of meter points in low voltage grid 
 - - 
High Voltage Zones  
   
hv zone Vattenfall High voltage zone of Vattenfall 
   
hv zone E.On High voltage zone of E.ON 
   
hv zone RWE High voltage zone of RWE 
   
hv zone EnBW High voltage zone of EnBW 
   
 
Concerning grid characteristics we expect a positive impact from the total size of the distribution 
area on all dependent variables. With regard to the share of distribution area per total area we expect 
similar results as for population density. However, we use the grid-based measure instead of popu-
lation density as supply areas are mostly larger than zip code regions. As distribution charges are 
paid for grid access, using zip code regions-related measures might result in deterred coefficients. 
Similar to Salies (2008) and Salies and Waddams Price (2004), we anticipate a scope effect of un-
derground lines since maintenance costs for cable lines are lower. Finally, we expect a negative 
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effect of the number of meter points on distribution charges because the problem of voltage fluctua-
tion on the distribution level could be reduced with more points. 
We have selected information for three alternative user groups which are 1500 kWh, 2800 kWh and 
4000 kWh per year since these usage levels are average consumption levels for one-, two- and 
more-than-two person households in Germany.
25
 Prices are average total prices per usage group per 
year since not the technical composition of prices but only the total price to pay is relevant for cus-
tomers since the annual electricity usage is (at least in the short run) constant.
26
 Customer infor-
mation is selected per household (not per person). Summary statistics for the alternative customer 
groups are presented in table 3 in the appendix. 
Table 2 provides a short summary of the competition variables used in the analysis. Values are 
means per usage group across all zip-code areas. While the total number of contracts is highest for 
one-person households and decreases for family households, the number of contracts with prices 
below the standard contract price is lowest for one-person households but highest for two-person 
households. While the number of providers remains constant for all user groups, more contracts 
with prices below the standard contract price are offered to two-persons-households. In contrast, we 
observe that the absolute (and also the relative) markup of standard contract prices above distribu-
tion charges increases from the 1500 kWh to the 4000 kWh contract. In particular for energy distri-
bution scale effects seem to exist (see also Salies, 2008) which are not passed on to customers. 
Table 2: Means of competition variables 
 1500 kWh 2800 kWh 4000 kWh 
# contr. below standard contract 88.4 92.5 91.3 
# providers 46.1 46.1 46.1 
standard contract price (in euro) 385.9 644.4 882.9 
incumbent’s lowest price contract 
(in euro) 
357.9 605.2 831.2 
total lowest price contract lowest 
price (in euro) 
286.2 524.7 706.8 
Markup (in euro) 282.7 481.2 664.3 
 
Comparing the incumbents’ competitive contract prices with those of the low price contracts of 
competitors we find incumbents’ competitive prices to be only between 6.0 and 7.4 percent below 
the standard contract price whereas the lowest competitor’s price is 18.5 to 26.7 percent below the 
standard contract price. Taking into account that less than 7 percent of all households have switched 
to an alternative provider but about 34 percent have switched to an alternative incumbent’s contract 
these figures point to a high market power of the incumbent providers. The findings in Salies and 
Waddams Price (2004) also support these results of the impact of demand shares on prices.  
                                                          
25
 We have compared average consumption levels from multiple sources, i.e. providers, associations and information 
portals who all offer similar recommendations and used the levels proposed by Verivox. 
26
 We focus on annual prices and ignore contract characteristics, such as electricity mix or prepayment. 
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Note that we exclude those zip-code areas for the econometrical analysis where more than one grid 
owner is active. These regions are crossover areas between alternative grids. 
5 Estimation Results and Discussion 
Estimation results are provided in table 4 in the appendix. The first three columns show the results 
of the analysis when using the number of contracts with prices below the incumbent’s standard con-
tract as a dependent variable in the supply equation. Columns 3 to 6 represent the results with the 
number of providers offering at least one contract in a region as a dependent variable. Finally, the 
last three columns show the estimation results of the ratio of the number of contracts to the number 
of providers ratio as the dependent variable.
27, 28
  
Concerning the outcomes of the theoretical model and the expectations from the descriptive discus-
sion we find mixed results: The coefficients for markup show the expected results only for the 
number of contracts. For the provider equations, however, they are ambiguous. The absolute 
markup coefficients are much lower for the provider equations and even insignificant for the 2800 
kWh equation whereas the introduction of an additional contract is significantly affected by the 
markup. We interpret this result as an increasing scope for price discrimination. Higher markup 
allows the competitors to extend discrimination (and offer more contracts) and at the same time undercut the 
standard contract price. 
As the incumbents use two-part tariffs it possible to target certain customer groups with different 
consumption levels, since a two-part tariff itself is an instrument for price discrimination. While the 
coefficient for 2800 kWh is statistically not significant, we confirm our hypothesis for 1500 kWh 
(one-person household). The lower the markup the lower is the number of competitors. Thus, set-
ting a lower standard price for this customer group the incumbent can prevent market entry e.g. pre-
vent competitors from offering attractive contracts to this group. The fact why this can happen is 
caused by switching behavior of customers that depend on their total consumption. According to the 
German Regulation Authority customers with high consumption are more likely to switch their 
supplier compared with customers with lower consumption (Bundesnetzagentur, 2010). The ra-
tionale is that the absolute savings increase with consumption whereas the absolute switching costs 
are likely to be nearly the same, i.e., the relative switching costs are lower for big households com-
pared with small households. Therefore, the outcome of the theoretical model may apply as lower 
price for standard contract prevent customers’ switching, so that the revenue driven effects are posi-
tive, and at the same time the lower price prevents market entry in this market segment. For some 
competitors, however, the low consumption group is not profitable, i.e. the expected profits from 
market entry are negative.  
We observe the opposite scenario for big households with high consumption (4000 kWh). In this 
market segment entry is still profitable for competitors although the markup might be low. Usually 
incumbents offer additional competitive contracts for customers who are willing to switch the sup-
plier. These are low priced contracts that have high cross-price effects with competitors’ prices. In 
                                                          
27
 As the large number of highly significant coefficients might be caused by potential overidentification problems due to 
the fact that our analysis is based on zip code level we conducted Hansen tests for overidentification, but the results 
reject the hypothesis of overidentification for our dataset. 
28 We mainly compare our findings with the results of Salies and Waddams Price (2004) and Salies (2008) as these 
papers are, to the best of our knowledge, most closely related to our models. 
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contrast to the case above, where the low consumption customers remain with the standard contract, 
the high consumption customers are likely to actively participate in supplier switching. This results 
in price discrimination between active and passive market participants as the price difference be-
tween “active” and “passive” customers can rise. Therefore, the profitability of market entry de-
pends mainly on the incumbents’ competitive prices for “active” customers. 
 Combining these findings with the significant results for distribution charge coefficient brings us to 
the following explanation: Following the literature on entry barriers access prices to an essential 
facility, the distribution charges, could be used as an instrument to foreclose providers, as, ceteris 
paribus, higher levels of distribution charges hinder a long-run oriented engagement of providers in 
a competitive market (see e.g. Laffont and Tirole, 2000). Thus, the increase of distribution charges 
is similar to the raise of downstream providers’ costs (see e.g. Salop and Scheffman, 1983). These 
results show the importance of effective regulation regimes. In particular vertically integrated net-
work operators have an incentive to discriminate against competitors. Thus, regulation has to pre-
vent artificial cost movements between downstream and upstream (network). Tough regulation is 
also required in a price- (or revenue-) cap regulation regime for strategic access pricing in different 
markets, such as household or business customers that aim at preventing market entry (Riech-
mann,2000). For example, in markets with (expected) lower competition intensity, charges might be 
lower than in markets which allow more competition and at same time are profitable for the incum-
bent. Higher charges could prevent entry or raise the competitors’ costs and create an advantage the 
retail incumbent. In that case the network can even cross-subsidize the low access charge in one 
market with higher charges in other markets as long as revenue-cap requirements are met. 
Salies (2008) extensively discusses the effect of regional factors on prices. While he finds a signifi-
cant negative effect of customer density in particular for smaller usage groups the impact of this 
measure loses significance in the case of higher energy consumption. Using distribution area per 
total area we find a negative effect of the related coefficients both in the standard contract price 
and distribution charge equations which corresponds to the results in the UK market and which 
might be due to the fact that the installation and maintenance of a distribution grid is more expen-
sive in less covered regions. With regard to the total size of the distribution area we find a positive 
effect on distribution costs particularly for the contract equations since the transmission costs also 
increase with the total grid length. Concerning the share of underground cables we find a signifi-
cant negative coefficient which in our opinion is mainly driven by lower maintenance costs and a 
lower impact of atmospheric conditions on underground circuits. We also observe a negative impact 
of the number of meter points. As already mentioned above, with a higher number of meter points 
voltage fluctuations on the total distribution grid might be reduced and thus lead to lower distribu-
tion costs. 
The share of apartment buildings in a particular region consists of a cost and a demand compo-
nent. First, scale effects with regard to energy provision might exist as households in apartment 
buildings can be served by one common distribution cable. Additionally, apartment buildings are 
mainly constructed in more densely populated areas. Salies’ (2008) scale effect argument is thus 
also supported by our estimations. Second, as the income of households living in apartment build-
ings is probably lower than the income of households living in single-family houses electricity pric-
es are of more relevance for these customers what raises low-price offers in these regions. 
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Additionally, we find that the higher the average purchasing power per household the lower the 
number of competitors in the relevant region. Concerning the fluctuation rate a highly significant 
positive impact on standard contract  
Figure 4: Number of providers per zip code area  
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prices is deduced. As described above, switching from a standard contract lasts about six to eight 
weeks. Moving households, therefore, switch to an alternative provider after they have moved and 
mostly ignore the opportunity beforehand. Thus, the data support the argument that there might be 
an advantage for the standard contract providers particularly in regions with a higher fluctuation 
rate.  
Concerning differences between high voltage areas as drivers for price and competition differ-
ences, significantly more providers and contracts exist in the EnBW area which is the smallest of 
the four high voltage areas in Germany. Taking a look at the effect on standard contract prices we 
find that they are also significantly higher in the EnBW area. In contrast, distribution charges are 
lower in the EnBW area in comparison to the three other areas. In summary, these findings support 
the hypothesis of a positive interrelation of the markup of standard contract prices over distribution 
charges with the number of competitors. Figures 4 and 5 provide graphical evidence for these re-
sults. The more shaded the region the higher the number of providers (Figure 4) or contracts (Figure 
5).
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In a nutshell, distribution charges are found to affect the number of competitors and the number of 
contracts. However, providers, for which distribution charges are no entry barrier, offer significant-
ly more alternative contracts the higher the distribution charges. With regard to the markup of 
standard contract prices over distribution charges we find significantly positive effects on the num-
ber of contracts but not on the number of providers in a big household segment. Solely for one-
                                                          
29
 Besides regional aspects there might be also ownership aspects which drive standard contract price differences among 
regions. As this interrelation is of particular interest for European markets with many public (local) owners and public 
private partnership relations we address the aspect of vertical integration and ownership with incumbents’ contract 
offers in subsequent companion study. 
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person household small consumption, we cannot reject our hypothesis as the number of entrants 
decreases with decreasing standard contract price. In contrast to big households, small households 
are likely to be “passive” and remain with standard contract, thus, it could be profitable for the in-
cumbent to lower the standard contract price to prevent switching and profitable market entry in this 
segment. Due to two-part tariffs it is possible to target specific customer groups, so that the standard 
contract price takes into account the relative high switching costs whereas the competitive contract 
price mainly accounts for competitors’ prices. Thus, the intense the competition the higher the price 
dispersion paid by “passive” and “active” customers per kWh.30 In our opinion, to increase competi-
tion it is required to further decrease switching costs and reduce information asymmetries across 
customers for alternative contracts. This might help to reduce the share of “passive” customers and 
at the same time reduce the prices due to increased competition.   
 
6 Conclusions 
The electricity distribution grid access is known to be a target of regulation since this part of the 
electricity grid is a natural monopoly which should not be duplicated. Instead, it should be opened 
for all electricity suppliers to reach potential customers at a regulated access price. What is not in 
the focus of regulation are the retail prices. All “non-switchers” are served by the so called standard 
contract offered by former monopolists. As these customers seem to be highly price-insensitive the-
se contracts are high-price contracts compared to other contracts in the market. 
We show in a theoretical model that the standard contract price level can affect the entry decision of 
potential competitors in retail electricity markets. In the benchmark case where market entry occurs 
and the incumbent then competes, it asks for higher standard contract prices and higher competitive 
contract prices than competitors. With a lower standard contract price, customers are less willing to 
switch and, additionally, it becomes more difficult for competitors to undercut the standard contract 
price. We have shown that under particular demand conditions depending on price elasticity this 
pricing strategy could be profitable for the incumbent.  
We test the theoretical findings employing data for German retail electricity competition for three 
different consumption levels (one-, two- and four-person households) which differ in their relative 
switching costs and the likelihood of switching suppliers.  While doing so, we separate effects on 
distribution charges from those that apply to pricing decisions and those which are relevant for 
both. We find that the markup of standard contract price over distribution charges has a significant-
ly positive effect mainly on the number of contracts. In contrast, the effect on the number of provid-
ers is ambiguous. For a customer group (one-person households), which compared to other groups 
have the highest relative switching costs, we could confirm our theoretical findings. Thus, the num-
ber of competitors is lower in markets in which the markup for the standard contract is low. Obvi-
ously in this case further market entry is not profitable. In contrast, for other customer groups we 
have to reject our hypothesis that lower markup prevents market entry. These results show that the 
incumbents’ try to divide the market into different segments and engage in price discrimination. 
Two-part tariffs allow the incumbents to target specific groups, meaning standard contracts for low-
er consumption levels and competitive contract for higher consumption levels. With its standard 
                                                          
30
 This finding confirms the theoretical results derived by Varian (1980).  
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contract pricing the incumbent can prevent market entry in low consumption segment. To increase 
competition also for this customer group instruments have to be implemented that reduce switching 
costs, especially in case of vertically integrated incumbents, and reduce information asymmetries 
across customers for offered alternative contracts. 
Tough regulation for vertically integrated incumbents is required as our results show that distribu-
tion charges have a negative impact on competition in terms of the number of competitors. Various 
theoretical studies show that an integrated network provider has the incentive to raise rivals costs. 
Although the network access charges are regulated there might be strategic choices among different 
markets, such as for household, business or industry customers, particularly in a revenue-cap re-
gime. Therefore, chances for discrimination among different markets need to be taken into account 
when implementing regulation regimes. Furthermore, recent studies show that non-price discrimi-
nation (for example Höffler and Kranz, 2011) could be also an issue that does not only affect rivals’ 
costs but also raises the switching costs for customers, e.g. by delaying the switching process.  
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Appendix 
Data Overview and Estimation Results 
In the following we separately display results for the 1500 kWh, 2800 kWh and 4000 kWh usage 
levels. A data overview is given in tables 3.   
Tables 4 show the coefficients and standard errors for the three measures of competition both for 
the unadjusted (first three columns) and the mean-adjusted (second three columns) estimations. 
Standard errors are displayed in brackets. The dependent variable is displayed in the first line of 
each equation. Below the estimation results we have displayed the root mean squared error results 
(RMSE) for each estimation equation as a whole. The RMSE is a measure of the goodness of fit and 
the lower it is the lower the linear deviation between the estimate and the actual value. 
 
Table 3a: Descriptive Statistics (average one-person households) 
1500 kWh # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# contracts 7899 237.8 33.2 32 341 
# contracts bel. standard contract  7899 88.4 31.2 5 203 
# providers 7899 46.1 6.167 13 62 
standard contract price 7899 385.9 18.4 291.6 459.3 
low contract price 7899 357.9 21.9 290.3 417.5 
lowest price 7899 286.2 11.2 220.5 351.0 
price difference 7915 282.7 18.7 198.2 334.0 
purchasing power/single hh 7893 41.5 44.8 0 290.0 
fluctuation rate 7891 0.106 0.050 0.002 1.738 
share apartment buildings 6514 0.365 0.169 0.051 0.939 
distribution charge 7915 103.3 12.4 69.7 149.6 
distribution area (lv) 7310 20.9 9.8 0.801 40.6 
distribution area (lv)/area 6350 0.459 0.170 0.161 1.009 
share cable 6225 0.693 0.102 0.300 0.975 
# meter points lv 7505 0.761 0.076 0.173 0.837 
hv zone Vattenfall 7833 0.208 0.406 0 1 
hv zone E.On 7833 0.429 0.495 0 1 
hv zone RWE 7833 0.239 0.426 0 1 
hv zone EnBW 7833 0.119 0.324 0 1 
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Table 3b: Descriptive Statistics (average two-persons households) 
2800 kWh # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# contracts 7912 183.4 33.4 32 276 
# contracts bel. standard contract 7912 92.5 29.8 5 196 
# providers 7912 46.1 6.165 13 62 
std. contract price 7912 644.4 28.8 542.2 807.8 
low contract price 7912 605.2 30.5 525.0 696.4 
lowest price 7912 524.7 7.984 393.6 574 
price difference 7906 481.2 26.7 389.5 604.9 
purchasing power/double hh 7907 69.4 67.3 0 581.6 
fluctuation rate 7904 0.106 0.050 0.002 1.738 
share apartment buildings 6505 0.365 0.169 0.051 0.939 
distribution charge 7906 163.2 19.4 113.6 230.6 
distribution area (lv) 7323 20.9 9.810 0.801 40.6 
distribution area (lv)/area 6363 0.459 0.170 0.161 1.009 
share cable 6216 0.693 0.102 0.300 0.975 
# meter points lv 7518 0.761 0.076 0.173 0.837 
hv zone Vattenfall 7846 0.208 0.406 0 1 
hv zone E.On 7846 0.429 0.495 0 1 
hv zone RWE 7846 0.240 0.427 0 1 
hv zone EnBW 7846 0.119 0.324 0 1 
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Table 3c: Descriptive Statistics (average three-and-more-persons households) 
4000 kWh # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# contracts 7899 173.7 30.3 32 276 
# contracts bel. standard contract 7899 91.3 27.0 3 189 
# providers 7899 46.1 6.167 13 62 
standard contract price 7899 882.9 40.7 728.5 1129.6 
low contract price 7899 831.2 39.6 680.0 959.4 
lowest price 7899 706.8 8.503 553.5 806.5 
price difference 7893 664.3 36.4 542.6 861.2 
purchasing power/family hh 7894 74.2 66.4 0 571.5 
fluctuation rate 7891 0.106 0.050 0.002 1.738 
share apartment buildings 6514 0.365 0.169 0.051 0.939 
distribution area (lv) 7310 20.9 9.8 0.801 40.6 
distribution area (lv)/area 6350 0.459 0.170 0.161 1.009 
share cable 7792 70.2 38.0 2.177 140.1 
# meter points lv 7505 0.761 0.076 0.173 0.837 
hv zone Vattenfall 7833 0.208 0.406 0 1 
hv zone E.On 7833 0.429 0.495 0 1 
hv zone RWE 7833 0.239 0.426 0 1 
hv zone EnBW 7833 0.119 0.324 0 1 
distribution charge 7893 218.6 26.5 154.0 310.4 
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Table 4a: Competition Equation, 
 log(# contracts below standard 
contract) 
log(# providers) log(# contracts below standard 
contract/providers)  
kWh 1500 2800 4000 1500 2800 4000 1500 2800 4000 
       
log(price diff) 2.581*** 2.400*** 2.276*** 0.170*** -0.012 -0.072*** 2.409*** 2.412*** 2.348*** 
(0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) 
log(distribution charge) 0.696*** 0.326*** 0.490*** -0.186*** -0.297*** -0.315*** 0.882*** 0.623*** 0.805*** 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
distribution area (lv)/area -0.052*** -0.106*** -0.097*** -0.014 -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.074*** -0.062*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
log(purchasing power/ -0.030*** -0.118*** -0.058*** -0.101*** -0.111*** -0.108*** 0.071*** -0.007 0.051*** 
hh size) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
share multi-apartment 
houses 
0.034*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.005* 0.017*** 0.004 0.011*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
fluctuation rate -0.006 0.009 -0.005 -0.012*** -0.005 -0.002 0.006 0.014*** -0.002 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
hv zone Vattenfall 0.684*** 0.827*** 0.767*** 0.482*** 0.509*** 0.523*** 0.201*** 0.317*** 0.244*** 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
hv zone E.On 0.864*** 0.958*** 0.970*** 0.500*** 0.486*** 0.484*** 0.363*** 0.472*** 0.486*** 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
hv zone RWE 0.846*** 0.952*** 0.992*** 0.476*** 0.494*** 0.501*** 0.370*** 0.458*** 0.492*** 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
hv zone EnBW 1.098*** 1.201*** 1.245*** 0.687*** 0.723*** 0.740*** 0.412*** 0.478*** 0.505*** 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
constant -33.7*** -30.6*** -32.7*** 3.227*** 6.800*** 7.997*** -36.9*** -37.4*** -40.7*** 
 (0.470) (0.509) (0.487) (0.288) (0.294) (0.282) (0.350) (0.385) (0.383) 
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Table 4b: Standard Contract Price Equation (continued) 
 log(# contracts below standard 
contract) 
log(# providers) log(# contracts below standard 
contract/providers)  
kWh 1500 2800 4000 1500 2800 4000 1500 2800 4000 
       
log(purchasing power/ -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.012*** 
hh size) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
share multi-apartment 
houses 
-0.027*** -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.023*** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
fluctuation rate 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
log(distribution area (lv)) 0.015*** 0.003** 0.002 0.012*** 0.001 -0.002 0.014*** 0.004*** 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
distribution area (lv)/area -0.021*** -0.009*** -0.001 -0.023*** -0.010*** -0.004* -0.020*** -0.009*** -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
share cable 
  
-0.050*** -0.067*** -0.087*** -0.040*** -0.066*** -0.079*** -0.057*** -0.069*** -0.091*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
log(# meter points lv) -0.069*** -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.069*** -0.051*** -0.047*** -0.061*** -0.055*** -0.047*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
hv zone Vattenfall 0.025*** 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.027*** 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.024*** 0.046*** 0.052*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
hv zone E.On -0.023*** -0.013* -0.011* -0.021*** -0.012* -0.009 -0.024*** -0.013* -0.011* 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
hv zone RWE 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
hv zone EnBW 0.048*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.051*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.046*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
constant 5.905*** 6.461*** 6.794*** 5.904*** 6.465*** 6.797*** 5.918*** 6.461*** 6.801*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
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Table 4c: Distribution Charge Equation (continued) 
 log(# contracts below standard 
contract) 
log(# providers) log(# contracts below standard 
contract/providers)  
kWh 1500 2800 4000 1500 2800 4000 1500 2800 4000 
       
log(distribution area (lv)) 0.021*** 0.005* 0.014*** 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
distribution area (lv)/area -0.057*** -0.053*** -0.039*** -0.067*** -0.055*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.037*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
share multi-apartment 
houses 
-0.036*** -0.056*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.034*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
share cable 
  
-0.419*** -0.372*** -0.397*** -0.399*** -0.371*** -0.363*** -0.461*** -0.386*** -0.415*** 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) 
log(# meter points lv) -0.328*** -0.291*** -0.290*** -0.308*** -0.275*** -0.266*** -0.299*** -0.298*** -0.271*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) 
hv zone Vattenfall 0.032* 0.060*** 0.065*** 0.037* 0.059*** 0.069*** 0.025 0.058*** 0.062*** 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) 
hv zone E.On -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.080*** -0.065*** -0.071*** -0.074*** -0.077*** -0.075*** -0.082*** 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) 
hv zone RWE -0.023 -0.010 -0.012 -0.019 -0.011 -0.008 -0.031* -0.012 -0.015 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) 
hv zone EnBW -0.191*** -0.132*** -0.120*** -0.182*** -0.132*** -0.111*** -0.202*** -0.136*** -0.125*** 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) 
constant 4.768*** 5.241*** 5.538*** 4.797*** 5.261*** 5.552*** 4.819*** 5.237*** 5.567*** 
 
(0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) 
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Table 4d: Summary Statistics (continued) 
 log(# contracts below standard 
contract) 
log(# providers) log(# contracts below standard 
contract/providers)  
kWh 1500 2800 4000 1500 2800 4000 1500 2800 4000 
Observations   
competition equation 4734 4725 4714 4734 4726 4714 4734 4726 4714 
price equation  4734 4725 4714 4734 4726 4714 4734 4726 4714 
dc equation 4734 4725 4714 4734 4726 4714 4734 4726 4714 
Parameters          
competition equation 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
price equation 11 11 11 
11 
 
11 
 
11 
 
11 
 
11 
 
11 
 
dc equation 9 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
RMSE          
competition equation 0.109 0.113 0.110 0.067 0.065 
0.064 
 
0.082 0.085 0.087 
price equation 0.032 0.028 0.029 0.032 0.028 0.029 0.032 0.028 0.029 
dc equation 0.081 0.068 0.065 0.081 0.068 0.065 0.081 0.068 0.065 
R2          
competition equation 0.914 0.893 0.895 0.737 0.748 0.759 0.925 0.904 0.900 
price equation 0.494 0.572 0.581 0.495 0.572 0.582 0.493 0.572 0.581 
dc equation 0.528 0.570 0.585 0.526 0.569 0.585 0.526 0.571 0.584 
  Note: Estimation Results using 3SLS method  
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
